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Using Incentives to Increase HIV/AIDS Testing by
Sex Workers: Evidence from a Randomized Field
Experiment in China
MARGARET BOITTIN

Can incentives increase the use of HIV/AIDS testing in criminalized populations? Lawbreakers
engaged in activities that place them at heightened risk of HIV/AIDS infection fear that engaging
with the state to request an HIV test could increase their likelihood of incurring sanctions for violating the law. This article reports on a randomized field experiment that evaluates whether material incentives can spur lawbreakers to seek state assistance. Sex workers in Beijing, China, were
randomly assigned to receive an in-kind incentive equivalent to $1 (control group) or $15 (treatment group) for getting an HIV test. Fifteen dollars corresponds to the average amount a sex
worker in the study might earn for one sexual transaction, and about 3 percent of her monthly earnings. The larger incentive increased HIV/AIDS testing rates by forty-two percentage points, on
average. Both low-tier sex workers, who solicit on the streets and in brothels, and those in the middle tier, who work in karaoke bars and clubs, responded strongly to the large incentive. In addition,
the large incentive was effective regardless of whether or not respondents were aware that prostitution is against the law. These findings suggest that modest incentives can have important effects
among criminalized populations in authoritarian settings.

I. INTRODUCTION

Lawbreakers who are at heightened risk of HIV/AIDS infection, such as sex workers and
intravenous drug users, hesitate to come forth and request HIV/AIDS tests. As with individuals who are not illegal actors, they incur both the psychological costs of HIV/AIDS testing,
such as fear of learning that they might be HIV positive and anxiety about possible stigma
from their community, and the monetary costs associated with time and travel for getting
tested (Howell and Shepperd 2013; Thornton 2008; Grusky, Roberts, and Swanson 2007;
Wolff et al. 2005; Ford et al. 2004; Hutchinson et al. 2004; Sullivan et al. 2004; Kalichman
and Simbayi 2003; Ginwalla et al. 2002; Mugusi et al. 2002; Coulibaly et al. 1998). In addition, their involvement in illegal behavior creates another barrier: they fear that engaging
with the state to request an HIV test could increase their likelihood of incurring sanctions
for having violated the law (Kaufman 2011; Wan et al. 2010; Zi Teng 2008; Wolffers and
van Beelen 2003; Blankenship and Koester 2002).
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Yet the state needs to reduce the spread of diseases among high-risk populations. This
requires easy access to these communities and trusting relationships whereby individuals
such as sex workers and drug users are willing to speak openly about their habits, get
tested for diseases such as syphilis or HIV/AIDS, and receive treatment. Three policies
may help achieve these goals. The first is to decriminalize or legalize the activity.1 The
second is to transfer health service provision for these populations to nonstate actors,
with whom lawbreakers are more likely to feel comfortable interacting than state
agents.2 The third, evaluated in this study, is to provide incentives to encourage illegal
actors to request HIV/AIDS tests.
Specifically, this article presents findings that refute previous assumptions about the
extent to which barriers to HIV/AIDS testing are entrenched among sex workers in
China and about the difficulties involved in increasing testing among those most in need
of it.3 I carried out a randomized controlled trial in which I varied the value of the incentive provided to sex workers in Beijing for getting an HIV/AIDS test. While previous
studies of the general population in democratized countries have found that incentives
can increase the demand for HIV/AIDS testing (Ngatia 2016; Thornton 2008), this is a
rare study design to carry out, as it involves not only an illegal population but also one
living in an authoritarian regime. Study participants were randomly assigned to receive
an in-kind incentive equivalent to either $1 (for the control group) or $15 (for the treatment group) for completing an HIV/AIDS test. The “Experimental Design” section of
this article discusses the steps taken to address concerns that study respondents might
ascribe a different value to an object than its monetary cost. These included selecting an
object useful to a sex worker and of which she knows the value, which was also mentioned to each respondent in the course of the study. Fifteen dollars is equivalent to the
amount a sex worker in the sample might earn for one sexual transaction, representing
about 3 percent of her monthly earnings. The larger incentive increased testing by fortytwo percentage points. Among those who received it, almost all (93 percent of study participants) obtained an HIV/AIDS test. Sex workers in both the lowest tier of the sex
industry (who solicit on the streets and in brothels) and in the middle tier (who work in
karaoke bars and clubs) responded strongly to the larger incentive. In addition, the large
incentive was effective regardless of whether or not study respondents were aware that
prostitution is against the law. Fifteen dollars is affordable from the perspective of the
state and nongovernmental organizations looking to reduce HIV/AIDS infection rates
in the community—it is an incentive amount that has been used in the context of other
health interventions in China that have been scaled up to reach large numbers of individuals in the population (Fan 2017; Miller 2016; Jacobs 2009). The results of the experiment thus show that a modest incentive can have important results for illegal
populations living in authoritarian regimes whose activities present public health risks.
It could also have implications for criminalized populations in other political regime
types. These are individuals who, even in democratic regimes, often avoid any engagement with the state (Weaver and Lerman 2010; Goffman 2009; Rose and Clear 1998).
Such behavior can deprive them of important social services (in areas such as health and
education) that are of benefit to both themselves and the community at large.

II. THE ROLE OF INCENTIVES IN MODIFYING BEHAVIOR

The intervention described in this article builds on a rich body of randomized controlled
trial studies that explore the role of incentives in changing behavior and, more specifically, a subset of this literature that specifically examines how incentives—both
© 2018 The Author
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monetary and in-kind—affect the demand for health. Although incentives are not
always successful at promoting healthful behavior (Acland and Levy 2013; Charness
and Gneezy 2009; Martins, Morris, and Kelly 2009; Volpp et al. 2006, 2009), plenty of
evidence points to their ability to increase the demand for health (Petry et al. 2012; de
Walque et al. 2012; Banerjee et al. 2010; Cohen and Dupas 2010; Kremer and Miguel
2007; Morris et al. 2004; Loevinsohn and Loevinsohn 1987). As pertains specifically to
incentives for HIV/AIDS testing, the two studies of which I am aware (Ngatia 2016;
Thornton 2008) both find this to be the case. Yet the research described in this article
distinguishes itself from these previous studies on the demand for health in two ways:
first, it focuses on a criminalized population; and second, it does so in an authoritarian
regime.
With specific reference to the studies most pertinent to the research presented here,
Thornton (2008) provided financial incentives ranging from $0 to $3 (USD) for obtaining the results of a free door-to-door HIV test in Malawi and found that incentives doubled the demand for HIV test results. She proposes that the incentives might help to
address psychological obstacles to learning HIV results, reduce the costs of time or
travel, and/or reduce the stigma around HIV testing by providing a public excuse for
individuals to request their results at a testing center (Thornton 2008).4 Pursuing related
questions, also in Malawi, Ngatia (2016) randomly assigned respondents to receive both
a small bag of sugar and a cash payment ranging from $0 to $4 (USD) in exchange for
taking an HIV test at a local testing center. The results indicated that the bag of sugar
increased the likelihood of getting tested by 50.71 percent, with each additional dollar
increasing the likelihood by 5.73 percent.5 In Thornton’s design, study participants
received door-to-door HIV testing and then were provided with an incentive if they traveled to an HIV center to get their results. Ngatia’s design, on the other hand, provided
an incentive for taking the test.6 Like Ngatia’s, my design focuses on the initial request
for an HIV test. In China, HIV/AIDS tests are only available at certain state-run health
institutions, and door-to-door testing run through those institutions is not widely available. As such, the key behavioral change upon which to focus is a sex worker’s willingness to physically go to a testing center to request the test.
The research presented here differs in two main ways from these two other studies on
the effects of incentives on the demand for HIV tests and their results. First, instead of
focusing on the general population, it specifically explores the impact of incentives on a
criminalized population: female sex workers. Second, it takes place in China, an authoritarian country with a very different political, social, cultural, and economic environment
than Malawi.
On one level, sex workers in China articulate the same concerns about testing as individuals who are not engaging in criminalized activity and who do not live under an
authoritarian regime. Indeed, this is a population whose barriers to testing include those
often attributed to the general population in many environments: anxiety and fear of
learning they may be HIV positive, the stigma attached to HIV-positive status, and the
costs (in money and time) of traveling to a testing site. Some of the costs associated with
the stigma attached to being HIV positive are internal; as one sex worker put it, “I’m
not willing to get tested. It’s because I’m scared I’d learn I have [HIV], which I would be
completely unable to accept.”7 Other costs are external and are tied to the marginalization that can result from testing positive. One sex worker who was HIV positive
described this stigma powerfully: “If people back home found out [I have HIV],” she
said, “they would drown me in their spit.”8
On another level, Chinese sex workers face additional barriers specific to their particular circumstances. As sellers of sex, they fear loss of income if a positive result prevents
© 2018 The Author
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them from continuing to engage in prostitution.9 They worry not only about the stigma
tied to being HIV positive but also about possible divulgation of their engagement in
prostitution, which could occur in the process of requesting an HIV test. As illegal
actors, they also fear that getting an HIV test could increase their likelihood of being
arrested for prostitution (Kaufman 2011; Wan et al. 2010; Zi Teng 2008; Wolffers and
van Beelen 2003; Blankenship and Koester 2002). It is here that the authoritarian regime
plays a key role in shaping sex worker perceptions of HIV/AIDS testing. On paper,
China’s HIV/AIDS policies, as well as doctor–patient confidentiality rules more generally, formally guarantee an individual’s anonymity and protect her identity. Chinese
health professionals should therefore not reveal information about the HIV status of a
patient, or the patient’s engagement in prostitution. As such, a Chinese sex worker, just
like a sex worker in a democratic regime where prostitution is against the law, should in
theory be protected from unwanted law enforcement interventions resulting from interactions with health workers. However, these policies are not necessarily respected. If
they are not, the limited protections for the individual rights of citizens in China mean
that a sex worker in the country is powerless to contest any unlawful state interference
into her life. More generally, the political regime has a serious impact on the experience
a sex worker might have if she were to be arrested. In describing the situation of some
sex workers in the United States, Levine and Mellema (2001) note that these women
view incarceration as an opportunity to “plan future scams, to rest, to get healthy, to get
food, to take advantage of social services, and to have a warm bed” (Levine and Mellema 2001, 183). Harsh law enforcement tactics and police abuse are such that sex
workers in China (Boittin 2013, 2015; Human Rights Watch 2013) would be unlikely to
espouse a perspective similar to the one described in Levine and Mellema’s work.
Instead, women engaged in prostitution in China who are considering an HIV test voice
concerns about their distrust of the government and their fear of arrest (Boittin 2013,
2015). The following testimonies of Chinese sex workers illustrate these issues:
Sex workers don’t trust the government. We are scared that the government will frame us,
and that if we enter a hospital [for an AIDS test], we won’t come back out. . . . I guarantee
that most sex workers won’t go to a government clinic.10
Every time I go get tested . . . I worry that the hospital worker will know that I am a sex
worker . . . and report me to the police.11
I don’t want any trouble. . . . Sometimes I don’t feel good, but I am not willing to get tested.
It’s because I’m scared to get tested, if they find out I am a sex worker.12
I’m not willing to get tested. It makes me really nervous, I’m terrified that people will know
that I am a sex worker . . . and then the police will catch me.13

Such concerns could also exist for sex workers in democratic regimes, where much
greater protections exist to prevent situations where a request for a health service could
result in trouble with law enforcement. Research on individuals who belong to criminalized
populations in the United States shows that they “define the power of the state as a nemesis
to be avoided rather than an ally to be cultivated” (Rose and Clear 1998, 465) and view
their illegality as “an all-encompassing aspect of their identity” (Weaver and Lerman 2010,
820). Like Chinese sex workers, black men in Philadelphia who have had entanglements
with law enforcement are instilled with an “overriding fear of capture” that can lead them
to “avoid institutions, places, and relations on which they formerly relied” (Goffman 2009,
340). More generally, experiences with the American criminal justice system have been
© 2018 The Author
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found to shape citizens’ political attitudes and behaviors, and “there is a large, negative
effect of criminal justice contact for several aspects of political life—turning out to vote,
involvement in civic groups, and trusting the government” (Weaver and Lerman 2010,
827). These types of issues are all heightened in an authoritarian regime, where citizens are
powerless to effectively contest state overreach into their lives.
Given the differences that exist between China and Malawi, and between an illegal
population, such as sex workers, and the general population, it is valuable to pursue a
research question similar to Thornton’s and Ngatia’s in a different setting and with a
different population. Thornton herself articulates this when she notes that “[i]t is important to keep in mind, however, that these results may differ in settings with higher prevalence rates or different social circumstances” (2008, 1859). Despite all of these
contextual differences, and as discussed in greater detail below in Section V.C, the
impact of the incentives in these two contexts is comparable.
To be clear, the causal claim I make in this article is that an in-kind incentive equivalent to $15 increases HIV testing rates for sex workers by forty-two percentage points,
on average. This increase is relative to an in-kind incentive equivalent to $1. I am not
able to make a causal claim with respect to the exact mechanism by which the incentive
may be effecting change—whether it might be working to compensate for fears of disease or arrest, addressing the direct costs of time and travel tied to testing, or reducing
social stigma by providing an excuse for getting tested. Instead, I highlight these as the
most frequently articulated obstacles to increasing HIV testing for illegal populations,
and show that a modest incentive can effectively overcome these stated barriers—even
among lower tier sex workers, who tend to have the highest risk of HIV/AIDS infection,
and among sex workers who know that prostitution is against the law.

III. PROSTITUTION, HIV/AIDS, AND CLASS IN CHINA

A. PROSTITUTION AND HIV/AIDS

Prostitution is against the law in China. Sanctions include fines of up to ¥5,000 ($750,
about fifty times the average price of a transaction in my sample), several years of incarceration, and public humiliation through shame parades (Fu and Choy 2009; Watts 2006).
Police abuse of sex workers while in custody, including torture, is also reported (Boittin
2013; Human Rights Watch 2013). Official data reports an average of 150,712 arrests per
year for “prostitution and soliciting prostitutes” from 1997 to 2013.14 These figures are
likely to significantly underestimate the actual number of arrests (Fu and Choy 2004). In
this study, 8 percent of sex workers reported having been arrested for prostitution. Despite
this illegality, prostitution is rampant. China’s business culture, centered around venues
that harbor prostitution, such as karaoke bars, results in a high demand for commercial
sex (Zheng 2009; Uretsky 2008). Official sources, likely to underestimate the magnitude of
the phenomenon, cite figures ranging from three to ten million sex workers in China, and
other estimates are as high as twenty million (Huang 2010; Bell 2007).
The incidence of HIV/AIDS infection among sex workers in China is high. In some
areas of the country, 10 percent of the sex worker population has tested positive for
HIV (Kaufman, Kleinman, and Saich 2006; Chen et al. 2005). While official data report
that less than 1 percent of sex workers are HIV positive (Ministry of Health of China
2010), important weaknesses in the state monitoring system suggest that this rate presents a significant underestimation (Boittin 2015; Human Rights Watch 2013). As discussed later, basic awareness of HIV/AIDS among sex workers is high, yet actual sexual
© 2018 The Author
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practices are a cause for concern. According to the country’s most representative study
of sex worker sexual behavior, only 19 percent of sex workers reported consistent use of
condoms (Horizon Market Research 2002).
This high supply of and demand for commercial sex, along with high rates of HIV/AIDS
among sex workers and unsafe sex practices, all present a potentially explosive public
health situation. As the virus spreads from sex workers and clients to third parties, such as
unsuspecting spouses, HIV/AIDS is taking root within the general population. Sexual
transmission has become the primary mode of HIV/AIDS infection in China (Ministry of
Health of the PRC 2013). In 2014, 92 percent of reported cases were acquired through sexual contact, up from 33 percent in 2006 (Ministry of Health of the PRC 2015). Nationally,
the prevalence of HIV/AIDS is uncertain. As of December 2014, the official number of
reported people living with HIV in China was 501,000 (ibid.). Nongovernmental experts
suggest that the actual number is significantly higher (Wan et al. 2010; Saich 2006); by
some estimates, it is around ten to fifteen million (Kaufman, Kleinman, and Saich 2006).
The infection rate also appears to be growing steadily at a rate of at least 30 percent annually (ibid.; BBC News 2006). The results of this study are thus all the more valuable given
the overall number of HIV cases and the current increase in sexual transmission: they suggest that a real opportunity exists to curb the spread of the disease before it becomes firmly
entrenched in the general population.
Chinese citizens who want an HIV/AIDS test need to go to state-run health institutions,
which are generally the only facilities authorized to provide such tests. HIV tests are provided free of charge (Wu et al. 2010). If an individual tests positive, the state provides them
with free antiretroviral (ARV) drugs under the “Four Frees, One Care” policy (the “Four
Frees” are free voluntary HIV counseling and testing, free antiretroviral treatment, free services for prevention of mother-to-child HIV transmission, and free education for AIDS
orphans; the “One Care” is social and financial support for HIV patients).
B. HIV TESTING AND CLASS

The Chinese sex industry can be divided roughly into three tiers. In the lowest tier,
women solicit on the streets and in brothels. These venues, which often masquerade as
hair salons and massage parlors, signal the services they actually provide with red lights
glowing in the windows. They also tend to lack sinks, scissors, and other tools generally
found in legitimate beauty parlors. Sex is the only service provided in this tier of the sex
industry. In the middle tier, karaoke bar and club hostesses drink, dance, and talk with
guests in addition to selling sex. In the top tier, a population that is not the object of this
study, escorts, mistresses, and second wives cater to elite businessmen and government
officials.
Within the overall population of sex workers, those of the lowest socioeconomic status are both the least likely to get tested and the most likely to need testing (Hong
et al. 2012; Yi et al. 2010; Choi and Holroyd 2007; Global Fund 2006). Low-tier sex
workers are at the greatest risk of contracting and spreading HIV, having the most clients, the least knowledge of HIV/AIDS, and the least agency to impose condom use on
clients. They are also at higher risk of arrest for prostitution: in contrast to women in
the middle tier, who can hide their engagement in prostitution behind the legitimate hostessing activities in which they engage, low-tier women work on the streets and in venues
that only provide sexual services, leaving them more exposed to law enforcement. Experiences with law enforcement can further decrease the willingness of these sex workers to
reach out to other types of state agencies such as health service providers. As discussed
below, the sex workers in this study reflect these tier-based differences.
© 2018 The Author
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

I conducted this experiment in December 2009 in a red light district in Beijing. In the
heart of the red light district, venues that act as fronts for prostitution, including karaoke bars, massage parlors, and hair salons, line both sides of the streets. The entire district is several square miles in area.
Staff at a sex worker outreach community center in the district recruited all sex
workers to be interviewed.15 Six of my research assistants conducted face-to-face interviews with a total of 213 sex workers, either at the community center or at the sex work
venues themselves. The interviews were about thirty minutes long. Among other questions, respondents were asked whether they had ever been tested for HIV/AIDS. Upon
completion of the interview, incentive amounts were allocated through simple randomization: the respondent was invited to draw a ping pong ball out of a bag, with different
colors indicating which of the in-kind incentives she would receive upon completing an
AIDS test. These incentives are described below. The participant was then given a card
(Figure 1), with a unique identifier for each participant, that gave detailed instructions
on getting to the hospital, getting her AIDS test, and redeeming her incentive.
Sex workers who were assigned to receive the small incentive received a white card,
while those who were assigned to receive the large incentive received a pink card.
Each cardholder was entitled to an AIDS test. As noted earlier, these must be provided free of charge in China. That said, without the card, participants could not have
gotten tested at the particular time and place indicated on the card.16 The hospital was
located a few blocks away from the heart of the red light district.17
During the designated days and hours specified on the card—three weekday afternoons during and following the days when respondents were interviewed for the pretest
survey—research assistants and community center staff waited in the hallway wing of
the hospital where the health tests were conducted, right outside the section where hospital staff drew blood for HIV tests. Any participant who got the test would walk by the
researchers on her way out and show both the experiment voucher and the form confirming that she had gotten the test.18 The researchers would verify both and make a
note of the card color (indicating small or large incentive) and number. Participants
could then collect their incentive.
I provided incentives in the form of objects, rather than cash. This decision was made
to address the concerns of leaders of the local community organization, who worried
that cash incentives might create an expectation of monetary remuneration for their
future projects and programs. In addition, they objected to having a “pure” control
group that would receive nothing in exchange for requesting an HIV test. They wanted
to diminish the possibility of resentment from individuals in the control group and felt

Figure 1. Image of Cards Provided to Study Participants.
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that a token incentive would suffice to protect them from criticism in the community.
The large incentive was a big boxed set of bed sheets and pillowcases, worth 100 yuan
($15), and the token incentive was a small pillow, worth 10 yuan (about $1) (Figure 2).
Incentives were chosen in collaboration with the community center and a focus group
of sex workers. The goal was to choose objects whose monetary value the women would
be able to identify. In addition, we wanted the large incentive to be useful. We chose the
boxed set of bed sheets and pillowcases because, in their line of work, sex workers frequently need to purchase them and know how much they cost. In selecting the small pillow, we sought to ensure that they would recognize it as a small token and not place
much value on it. To further emphasize the monetary worth of each incentive, the enumerators would state their value to each study participant. A number of previous randomized experiments have also successfully substituted objects for cash incentives
(Lacetera, Macis, and Slonim 2012; Banerjee et al. 2010; Goette and Stutzer 2008). As
the authors of these studies note, the key issue with providing objects is that individuals
may ascribe a different value to them than their monetary cost. A number of nonfinancial factors—color, utility, prior possession of object, etc.—may influence one’s object
preference. The selection process I used minimizes these concerns.

V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

A. PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS

Table 1 presents statistics on the characteristics of study participants. Given how difficult it is to access sex workers in China, none of the limited number of carefully conducted surveys of this population have samples that are representative, either nationally
or locally. That said, in order to provide some sense of how sex workers in this study
compare to others, Appendix I compares some of the basic characteristics of study participants with those of other surveys of Chinese sex workers.
The sex workers in my sample are older than might be expected. Two factors may be
at play here. First, the red light district where the survey was conducted caters mainly to
middle- and lower-class men. Younger women, who are in greater demand, are more
likely to work in more elite venues where they are paid higher amounts. Second, while
some women enter the sex trade around the age when they would otherwise enter the
legitimate workforce, others are pushed into prostitution later on in life. In Northeastern
China, where 56 percent of respondents are from, significant layoffs of employees of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the late 1990s resulted in high levels of unemployment

Figure 2. Images of Small Incentive (Pillow) and Large Incentive (Set of Bed Sheets and
Pillowcases).
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Field Experiment Participants

Variable
Respondent Characteristics
Age (mean) (N = 209)
Married (%) (N = 213)
From Rural Area (vs. Urban) (%) (N = 213)
Completed Mandatory 9 Years of Schooling (Graduated from
Middle School) (%) (N = 213)
Have Children (%) (N = 194)
Number of Children among Respondents with Children (mean) (N = 130)
Number of Children (mean) (N = 194)
Sex Work Experience
Number of Years Selling Sex (mean) (N = 211)
Age at which Started Selling Sex (mean) (N = 198)
Middle Tier Brothel Work (Karaoke Bar) (%) (N = 213)
Lower Tier Brothel Work (%) (Massage Parlor, Hair Salon, Street) (%) (N = 213)
Reported Price of Most Recent Transaction (mean) (N = 191)
Health Knowledge and Practices
Has Heard of Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs) (%) (N = 211)
Has Heard of AIDS (%) (N = 212)
General Health Checkup in Previous Year (%) (N = 211)
Previously Had an AIDS Test (%) (N = 210)

32 years (SD: 6.7)
63
55
78
70
1.1 (SD: .46)
.75 (SD: .65)
3 years (SD: 2.4)
28 years old (SD: 6.1)
82
18
¥548 /$86 (SD: ¥321 /$50)
92
98
65
25

for men and women. Prostitution has emerged as an alternative for women unable to
find other employment.
The 63 percent marriage rate may appear high for sex workers. Sex workers are overwhelmingly migrants whose husbands do not migrate with them. Shielding a husband
from knowledge of one’s involvement in prostitution is not difficult in such circumstances. Some respondents reported having more than one child. In rural areas, the onechild policy allows for a second child if the first one is a girl.19 Additional children
require parents to pay a fine, usually proportional to the violator’s income. This fine
may precipitate someone’s decision to migrate and enter the sex trade (Boittin 2015).
Education is mandatory in China through middle school, and the state reports about
an 80 percent attendance rate through middle school (Ministry of Education of the PRC
n.d.). The women in this sample, with 78 percent graduating from middle school, closely
approximate official nationwide figures.
Within my sample, 82 percent of participants were middle-class sex workers working
in karaoke bars. The remaining 18 percent were from the lowest stratum of sex workers,
soliciting in massage parlors, hair salons, and on the streets.20
The reported mean of ¥548 ($86) for their most recent transaction is likely inflated, as
the stigma of prostitution leads respondents to report higher payment for one transaction. In reality, the sex workers in this study were most likely earning closer to $15 per
transaction, rather than $86 (Boittin 2015). More specifically, women who work in
middle-class venues such as karaoke bars might earn ¥100 to ¥200 ($16 to $32) per transaction. Those in the lowest tiers of prostitution, working in massage parlors, hair salons,
and on the streets, earn between ¥20 and ¥100 ($3 to $16).
All but 2 percent of respondents had heard of HIV/AIDS, and 92 percent were also
aware of the existence of sexually transmitted diseases. Such levels are consistent with
those reported in other research on sex workers (Horizon Market Research 2002). In
addition, 65 percent of respondents noted that they had had a health checkup in the previous year. Sex workers generally seek out such checkups at unregistered clinics that are
© 2018 The Author
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Table 2. Comparison of Low- and Middle-Tier Sex Workers for Key Variables
Variable

Low Tier (Mean)

Middle Tier (Mean)

P-Value

33
84
30
415
97
92
22
53

31
77
28
573
92
99
26
67

0.09
0.34
0.05
0.01
0.24
0.00
0.58
0.08

Age (Years)
Education (Mandatory 9 Years) (%)
Age at Which Started Selling Sex (Years)
Reported Price of Most Recent Transaction (Yuan)
Has Heard of STDs (%)
Has Heard of AIDS (%)
Previous AIDS Test (Self-Reported) (%)
General Health Checkup in Previous Year (%)

neither regulated nor legal (Bristow 2009). These are ubiquitous in red light districts.
This high rate of checkups cannot be interpreted as evidence of sex worker willingness
to interact with state institutions and used to counter the earlier discussion of additional
barriers to HIV testing that this population faces. Table 1 also shows that 25 percent of
participants reported having received an HIV/AIDS test at some point in the past. Given
social desirability bias issues, this is likely an overestimate of the percentage of respondents who have actually gotten this test in the past.
The tier-based differences mentioned earlier, where low-tier sex workers are both
more at risk of HIV/AIDS infection and less likely to get tested, come through in an
examination of some of the key variables examined in the previous table, broken down
by prostitution tier. Table 2 compares characteristics of low- versus middle-tier sex
workers for relevant variables.
Lower-tier sex workers reported lower payments for their most recent transaction in
comparison to their middle-tier counterparts. While I noted earlier that these numbers
are generally inflated, there is no reason to believe that they would be disproportionately
exaggerated in one group compared with the other. Lower rates per transaction may
lead to greater numbers of clients, which in turn can increase one’s risk of HIV/AIDS.
This difference is statistically significant. General knowledge of both STDs in general
and HIV/AIDS in particular is high across the board for both groups. A smaller percentage of low-tier sex workers (92 percent) than middle-tier sex workers (99 percent) had
previously heard of AIDS, and the difference is statistically significant. In contrast, a
greater proportion of low-tier sex workers (97 percent) than middle-tier ones (92 percent)
had heard of STDs, and this difference is not statistically significant. As expected, lowtier sex workers were less likely to have had a health checkup in the year preceding the
intervention (53 versus 67 percent), and this difference is statistically significant. Finally,
a smaller percentage of women in the low-tier group reported having had a previous
AIDS test (22 versus 26 percent), though this difference is not statistically significant.

B. RANDOM ASSIGNMENT

Using simple randomization, participants were assigned to receive either a small incentive (the control group) or a large incentive (the treatment group) by lottery. Through
this process, 107 participants were assigned to receive the small incentive, and 106 participants were assigned to receive the large incentive. Randomization ensures unbiased
assignment to the control and treatment conditions and provides an expectation that the
two groups will have the same observable and unobservable attributes. To check for balance across potential confounders, I conducted a simple difference-in-means test across
fourteen baseline covariates: five basic demographic variables, four variables pertaining
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Table 3. Results of Covariate Balance Tests

Variable
Basic Demographic
Age (in years)
Rural
Married
Completed Mandatory
Education
Low Tier of
Prostitution
Perceptions of and
Experiences with
Authorities
Trust in Local
Government
Trust in Police
Previous Arrest
Think Prostitution Is
Legal
Health Behaviors and
Knowledge
Previously Had an
AIDS Test
Had a Health
Checkup in
Previous Year
Knowledge of STDs
Knowledge of AIDS
Length of Time Selling
Sex (in months)

Small Incentive (Control)
Mean and Standard
Deviation

Large Incentive (Treatment)
Mean and Standard
Deviation

Difference

P-Value

28 (6.4)
57% (.048)
64% (.046)
78% (.041)

28 (5.9)
54% (.048)
62% (.047)
79% (.04)

0.02
0.03
0.02
0.02

0.98
0.637
0.74
0.77

25% (.042)

10% (.029)

0.15

0.00

83% (.04)

.75% (.05)

0.08

0.18

53% (.05)
8.4% (.03)
23% (.04)

57% (.05)
7.5% (.03)
26% (.04)

0.04
0.008
0.03

0.59
0.82
0.63

21% (.04)

30% (.04)

0.09

0.154

59% (.05)

70% (.04)

0.11

0.09

94% (.02)
96% (.02)
37 (3)

91% (.03)
100% (0)
34 (2.6)

0.03
0.04
3.5

0.41
0.04
0.39

Note: Regressing the treatment variable on all fourteen covariates fails to reject the null hypothesis that all
coefficients are equal to 0 (F = 1.30, p = 0.2125, R2 = 0.1083).

to respondent perceptions of and experiences with authorities, and five health behavior
variables. Balance is particularly important for all of these variables as they could each
influence sex worker requests for HIV/AIDS tests. Respondents who are less educated
may have less knowledge about HIV/AIDS and therefore perceive the opportunity to
get tested differently from those with higher levels of education. As noted earlier, sex
workers who work in the lowest tier of prostitution (i.e., whose socioeconomic status is
lowest) are the least likely to get tested and the most likely to need it. With respect to
perceptions of and experiences with the authorities, individuals who are less trusting,
who have previously been arrested for prostitution, or who think that selling sex is legal
may react differently to the provision of an incentive to get an HIV test at a state-run
hospital. Health variables that could affect a sex worker’s willingness to get an HIV test
include their general awareness of AIDS and STDs, previous HIV testing and health
checkup behavior, and length of time in the sex industry. Table 3 provides the results of
these covariate balance tests.
These results reveal statistically significant differences between covariates for three
variables: tier of prostitution (p < 0 .05), knowledge of AIDS (p < 0.05), and previous
health checkup (p < 0.10). In addition, there is a substantive (but statistically
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insignificant) imbalance on another covariate: self-reports of previous AIDS tests.21
However, regressing the treatment variable on all fourteen covariates fails to reject the
null hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to 0 (F = 1.30, p = 0.2125, R2 = 0.1083).
The difference in knowledge of AIDS, while significant, is not of substantive concern,
as it is extremely high in both groups: 96 percent for those assigned to the small incentive
and 100 percent for those assigned to the large one. The balance that exists in knowledge
of STDs, a variable similar to knowledge of AIDS, helps confirm this interpretation of
the AIDS knowledge imbalance.
The difference in tiers across treatment assignment is large and significant. This is a
possible confounder: as discussed above, low-tier sex workers are less likely to seek
HIV/AIDS testing. However, I execute analyses of the treatment assignment within tier
in order to estimate a separate treatment effect for lower-tier and middle-tier participants (see Figure 4).
The greatest concern for confounding is related to the difference in self-reported previous AIDS tests across treatment groups. Although the difference in means is statistically insignificant, the substantive difference is moderately large (21 versus 30 percent).
Of course, self-reported behavior does not necessarily represent actual behavior, but,
even setting this aside, it is likely that participants who have previously had an
HIV/AIDS test have a higher propensity to get another HIV/AIDS test, potentially biasing estimates of the effect of the incentive. To mitigate this concern, I provide analyses
in which I estimate the effect of the incentives only among those who have previously
had an HIV/AIDS test and only among those who have not (see Figure 5). Appendix II
also presents regressions that control for these covariates.

C. EFFECTS OF THE TREATMENTS ON THE DEMAND FOR AN HIV TEST

Of the participants who were assigned a small incentive, 51 percent obtained an HIV
test. Of those who were assigned a large incentive, 93 percent obtained an HIV test.
Figure 3 illustrates this difference in testing rates, which is significant at p < .001.
The treatment effect is extremely large. A total of 51 percent of study participants
who received a token incentive worth $1 requested an HIV test.22 The large incentive,
the equivalent of $15, caused a forty-two percentage point increase in the demand for an
HIV test, such that 93 percent of those assigned to receive the large incentive requested
the test.23 Given the study design, what is unambiguous is the value of a larger incentive
relative to a small one. A set of bed sheets worth $15 prompted over 90 percent of participants to get tested compared to the 51 percent rate among those receiving the token
incentive worth $1—a more than 80 percent increase. Since the control group also
received an incentive, the forty-two percentage point increase could be considered a
lower bound on the effectiveness of the larger incentive—the increase might have been
greater if the control group had received no incentive at all. As noted earlier, $15 represents the amount that the study participants might receive from one transaction. Their
monthly income ranges from ¥1,000 to ¥3,000 (about $150 to $475), so the incentive
amounts to 3 to 10 percent of their monthly earnings. At the same time, these are lowerand middle-class migrant women who, if they were not working in the sex industry,
would most likely find employment in factories or in the service industry as waitresses,
where their monthly earnings would be closer to $45 to $75 (Magnani and Zhu 2012).
Viewed from this baseline, the incentive is much larger and may have been more valuable to the women as a result: it amounts to one-fifth to one-third of the monthly earnings of others in their social class.
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Figure 3. Large Incentive Had Important Effect on Demand for HIV/AIDS Test.

The magnitude of this effect is comparable to the effect observed in previous studies using
incentives to encourage an individual to request health interventions. In Thornton’s 2008
study of the general population in Malawi, 34 percent of respondents in the control group
sought to learn their HIV results, a rate that is sixteen percentage points lower than the rate
observed in the sex workers in this study (51 percent). The incentives in the Thornton study
ranged from zero to $3. The average incentive was for $1.01, the equivalent of about one
day’s wage. That amount is comparable to the value of the $15 large incentive in my study,
as it corresponds to about 3 percent of a sex worker’s monthly earnings. Thornton found a
forty-three percentage point difference in demand for test results between those who
received no incentive and those who received some incentive, which is close to the forty-two
percentage point difference in the case of sex workers in China. Even the smallest incentive
in the Thornton study—one-tenth of a day’s wage—doubled the demand for HIV test
results. Similarly, the Ngatia (2016) study found that a bag of sugar increased the likelihood
of getting tested by 50.71 percent and that each additional dollar increased the likelihood of
getting tested by 5.73 percent. Banerjee et al. (2010) found that demand for immunizations
more than doubled, to 38 percent, for individuals assigned to receive lentils and thalis following a request for a vaccine. These effects are all close to the forty-two percentage point
difference that I found between sex workers who received the small incentive and those who
received the larger one.24 While the analyses reported thus far compare outcomes across the
two randomly assigned conditions without controlling for any observational covariates,
Appendix III presents analyses with covariates included, demonstrating that these results
are robust to specification. In addition, as shown in Appendix III, the findings are also
robust using a nonparametric Pearson’s Chi-squared test.

D. WHO RESPONDS TO INCENTIVES?

On average, individuals who received the large incentive were much more likely to get
an HIV test, but the effect could differ for subgroups. I turn next to exploring the characteristics of sex workers who are more or less likely to respond to incentives.
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Figure 4. Large Incentive Brought Low-Tier Sex Worker Testing Levels up to Those of MiddleTier Sex Workers.

As I discuss earlier, there are strong substantive reasons to focus on class as a predictor of
willingness to get an HIV/AIDS test. Previous research highlights the disconnect between
higher needs for HIV/AIDS testing among low-tier sex workers and lower demand for testing within that subset of the population (Boittin 2015; Hong et al. 2012; Yi et al. 2010; Choi
and Holroyd 2007; Global Fund 2006); I therefore focus on class-based responses to the
incentive. On one level, it might be expected that women in the lowest tiers of the sex industry would respond more to the large incentive than their higher-class colleagues, given the
higher relative worth of the $15 incentive for low-tier sex workers, but in fact it is precisely
the streetwalkers and women in low-class brothels who are most resistant to seeking out voluntary HIV tests, a consideration suggesting that they might not respond as well to the large
incentive. Figure 4 presents the data on HIV test demand based on whether the respondent
works in a low- or middle-class venue. The results suggest that the large incentive is highly
effective at increasing testing rates for women working in both the low and middle tiers of
the sex industry, despite a pattern of overall lower testing rates among low-tier sex workers.
Among sex workers assigned to receive the small incentive, middle-tier sex workers
were thirty-four percentage points more likely to request an HIV/AIDS test than their
low-tier counterparts (p < .01): 26 percent of low-tier sex workers got tested, while
60 percent of middle-tier sex workers did so. The large incentive then brought low-tier
sex workers’ testing levels to those of middle-class workers: 91 percent of low-tier sex
workers assigned to the large incentive received an HIV test, while 94 percent of their
middle-tier colleagues did so. The three percentage point difference between low- and
middle-tier sex workers who received the large incentive is not statistically significant.
The large incentive was effective at increasing the demand for HIV testing among both
low- and middle-tier sex workers. In both groups, more than 90 percent of those assigned to
the incentive worth $15 requested an HIV test. Yet the large incentive had a particularly
powerful impact on women in the low tier: it more than tripled their demand for an HIV
test, with 26 percent of respondents assigned to the small incentive requesting an HIV test
and 91 percent of respondents assigned to the large incentive requesting one. By contrast,
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for women in the middle tier, the large incentive increased demand for an HIV test by
thirty-four percentage points, from 60 percent to 94 percent. In comparing those who
received the large incentive with those who received the small incentive by tier of prostitution, the difference is statistically significant at p < .05.25 The difference in treatment effect
was roughly twice as large for the low-tier sex workers, boosting their testing rate by an
additional thirty-one points (p < .05). Importantly, as the right-hand side of Figure 4 shows,
this differential treatment effect eliminates the thirty-four–point disparity in testing rates we
observed when the incentive was small. These results are robust to specification and the
inclusion of control variables, including whether or not the respondents self-reported having
previously received an HIV/AIDS test and whether or not they had gotten a health checkup
in the previous year (see Appendix II). Thus, it appears that any greater aversion to HIV
testing associated with low-tier sex workers can easily be overcome with an incentive worth
$15. This within-tier analysis shows that the statistically significant differences in tiers across
treatment assignment do not serve as a confounder of study results: tier-based differences in
response to incentives persisted despite this treatment assignment imbalance.
E. RESULTS IN RELATION TO SELF-REPORTED RATES OF PREVIOUS HIV TESTING

As noted earlier, respondents who self-reported having previously received an HIV/AIDS
test were more likely to be assigned to receive the large incentive. Assuming self-reporting
accurately reflects actual behavior, this difference could serve to bias estimates of the effect
of the incentive: a sex worker who has already gotten an HIV/AIDS test in the past may be
more likely to request one again. In order to address this concern, I examined treatment
effects according to whether or not the respondents self-reported having previously gotten
an HIV/AIDS test. Figure 5 presents the results of this analysis.
Respondents who self-reported having previously gotten an HIV/AIDS test were
more responsive to the small incentive than those who did not self-report previous testing: 64 percent of those who self-reported got tested, versus 49 percent of those who did
not. The large incentive had a strong impact on both of these groups, with a twentyseven percentage point increase in testing for those who self-reported having gotten
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Figure 5. Large Incentive Increased Demand for HIV/AIDS Testing Both for Respondents Who
Did and Did Not Report Previous HIV/AIDS Test.
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tested (increasing to 90 percent of respondents) and a forty-five percentage point
increase for those who did not self-report having gotten tested (increasing to 95 percent
of respondents).26 These results show that incentives have a strong impact regardless of
whether or not the respondent had previously gotten an HIV/AIDS test.
F. RESULTS CONDITIONAL ON RESPONDENT KNOWLEDGE OF THE ILLEGALITY OF
SEX WORK

The sex worker testimonies shared earlier underscore that fear of arrest is an obstacle to
HIV/AIDS testing. Yet not all sex workers are aware that engaging in prostitution is
actually against the law. An analysis that focuses on the differential impact of the large
incentive on sex workers according to whether or not they are aware that sex work is
illegal sheds additional light on the question of whether or not incentives are a useful
way of encouraging behavioral change among criminalized populations. Figure 6 shows
the demand for HIV testing according to whether or not respondents knew that prostitution is against the law. It demonstrates that the large incentive effectively increased
HIV/AIDS testing rates among respondents who knew they were breaking the law.
Respondents who knew that prostitution is against the law were less responsive to the
small incentive than those who thought that it was legal: 49 percent of sex workers who
correctly identified prostitution as illegal got tested when assigned to receive the small
incentive, compared with 54 percent of those who thought they were engaging in legal
behavior. That said, this difference is not statistically significant. Both groups were
extremely receptive to the large incentive. It increased the demand for an HIV/AIDS test
by forty-eight percentage points (from 49 to 97 percent) for respondents who were aware
that prostitution is against the law. The larger incentive had a smaller impact on respondents who thought that they were engaging in a legal activity, increasing their demand
for an HIV/AIDS test by thirty-one percentage points, from 54 to 85 percent. Substantively, the large incentive had a greater impact on respondents who knew that they were
breaking the law (forty-eight percentage points versus thirty-one percentage points).
That said, this difference is not statistically significant.27
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Figure 6. Large Incentive Increased Demand for HIV/AIDS Testing Regardless of Sex Worker
Knowledge That Prostitution Is Illegal.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

The implications of this study are significant. It shows that a real opportunity exists to
increase HIV testing among marginalized populations such as sex workers in authoritarian
regimes. It also suggests that it is possible to increase testing for those most in need
(i.e., those who are working in the lowest tiers of prostitution) and that incentives are effective regardless of whether or not sex workers are aware that prostitution is against the law.
The obstacles frequently cited as working against a sex worker’s willingness to request an
HIV test include psychological costs tied to learning one’s HIV status and possible stigma
if a positive result becomes public, as well as monetary costs tied to time and travel for testing. In addition to these barriers, which sex workers share with the general population, as
individuals engaged in illegal behaviors, they also face additional concerns that requesting
an HIV test would increase their likelihood of punishment for violating the law. Yet the
results of this study show that an incentive worth $15 is an extremely effective tool for
overcoming these stated concerns. Importantly, this dollar amount is small enough for such
an intervention to be carried out on a large scale. In 2008, the Gates Foundation launched
a five-year, $50 million HIV/AIDS prevention project in China. While it was not focused
on female sex workers, an important component of the project involved providing cash
incentives worth about $15 to other populations at high risk of HIV/AIDS to get an HIV
test, such as men who have sex with men (MSM) (Jacobs 2009). The fact that this type of
organization is devoting significant resources toward incentives to increase HIV/AIDS testing for individuals at high risk of HIV/AIDS shows that there are real possibilities for the
results of this study to be used for a larger public policy intervention.
As mentioned in the introduction, the two policies generally discussed to address the
issue of low levels of HIV/AIDS testing among sex workers are (1) the decriminalization
or legalization of prostitution and (2) the outsourcing of HIV/AIDS testing from state
institutions to community organizations. Within China, scholars and policymakers who
have called for the former approach include Li Yinhe, a prominent public intellectual
and sociologist on issues of sexuality and women’s studies (Li 2013); Pan Suiming, a
sociologist and leading researcher on prostitution in China (Pan 2008); Chi Susheng, a
National People’s Congress (NPC) deputy from the northeastern province of Heilongjiang who drafted an NPC proposal to legalize consensual adult prostitution (Dayang
Wang 2012); and Zhou Ruijin, one of the chief voices of reform within the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), the former editor of China’s Liberation Daily, and former deputy editor-in-chief of the People’s Daily, which is the official mouthpiece of the CCP
(Zhou 2006). Advocates of the latter include officials working in China’s health agencies
(Ren et al. 2015; Rou et al. 2010) and Wan Yanhai, one of China’s leading civil society
activists on HIV/AIDS in China (Wan et al. 2010). Major public health organizations,
such as the World Health Organization and UNAIDS, advocate for the decriminalization of prostitution as necessary to meaningfully reduce barriers to HIV testing (World
Health Organization, UNFPA, and UNAIDS 2012; UNAIDS 2009), and they channel
important resources toward advancing this goal. However, although such regulatory
changes may increase HIV testing and reduce the prevalence of HIV, they are extremely
difficult to implement. The proposal advanced here presents an immediate, previously
overlooked alternative, one that is much needed given the urgency of stemming the
spread of HIV and the role of sex workers and their clients as vectors of the disease.
Mine is not the first study to find that a modest incentive successfully increases the
demand for an HIV/AIDS test (Ngatia 2016; Thornton 2008), but it is the first to do so
in the context of an authoritarian country and an illegal population that is at a particularly high risk of HIV/AIDS.
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The challenges of carrying out a randomized-controlled trial in such an environment with
this population were significant, some of which need to be considered with respect to the external validity of the study. First, sex workers were not sampled randomly, and I have no data
on nonstudy participants. I would expect systematic exclusion of two types of female sex
workers who may be at higher risk of HIV: those engaged in the worst forms of forced prostitution, who are completely deprived of any freedom of movement; and those who, while free
to take part in the study, self-selected out because their fears of disease or arrest were so great
that they were not even willing to step forward and participate in the pretest survey and treatment assignment process. The effects of the incentive on these women would likely not have
been as strong as on those who participated in the study. Second, as discussed earlier, a local
community organization (as opposed to the state) carried out the study. This could increase
the demand for an HIV test, as sex workers might feel greater trust toward a civil society organization than a government agency (Kaufman 2011).28 If the entire program had been carried
out directly through a state institution (for example, if state hospital workers had recruited
participants), then sex workers might have been more distrustful and hesitant to participate in
the initial pretest survey. The role of the community organization should therefore be taken
into consideration in future replications of the study.29 Third, as discussed throughout the
article, there is no pure control group. While the small incentive is only worth $1 and was chosen (with the assistance of a sex worker focus group) to be clearly symbolic, it is still different
from a pure control. Reference to self-reported previous HIV/AIDS testing, while suggestive,
does not allow for a causal statement on the effect of the small incentive versus no incentive at
all. Fourth, I am unable to establish the causal mechanism by which this intervention functions to increase demand for HIV tests. While I have underscored the various barriers that sex
workers face and highlighted a tier-based response pattern that I chose to examine based on
my overall research and knowledge of prostitution in China, I am unable to conclusively show
the way in which the incentive works to change behavior.
In addition, it is important to keep in mind that two nonincentive, protocol-related
factors could have played a role in the decision of all sex worker study participants to
request an HIV test. First, the pretest questionnaire, administered immediately prior to
treatment assignment, included questions about prior HIV testing, knowledge of
HIV/AIDS, self-assessed likelihood of having HIV/AIDS, and prevention practices.
Such questions could serve either to increase the salience of HIV, resulting in overall
higher testing rates for all study participants, or to increase anxiety around HIV, reducing testing demand. Second, the invitation to participate in an organized study could
have increased the demand for HIV testing.
In addition to considering replicating this study among other illegal populations in
authoritarian settings, this study’s results may also be relevant to altering the behavior of
marginalized individuals in different political regime types. Indeed, if an incentive for such
groups is effective in the harder case of an authoritarian regime, there is reason to believe it
could also be impactful in more open societies. Research in the United States shows that
individuals who have broken the law (such as illegal immigrants, victims of cross-border
human trafficking, or intravenous drug users) often shrink away from any involvement with
the state and avoid key institutions that could provide them with access to health, education,
or other social services (Weaver and Lerman 2010; Goffman 2009; Rose and Clear 1998).
Incentives in these cases could similarly help encourage more engagement with agencies and
organizations that are in a position to provide much-needed services to these populations,
benefiting not only the members of these populations in particular but also society at large.
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NOTES

1. Such a policy change might represent a long-term solution, but it often encounters significant
resistance from actors within the state and civil society.
2. This approach can be highly effective in some environments. However, it requires the existence
of a robust civil society and a state that is willing to entrust such responsibility to social organizations. It also requires that lawbreakers distinguish between state and nonstate actors and
trust the latter to protect their anonymity.
3. While male-to-male, male-to-female, and female-to-female commercial sex also occur in
China, this study focuses on female commercial sex for male clients.
4. Thornton’s study also varies the distance of the HIV results center, and she measures behavioral change following an HIV-positive result based on the number of condoms purchased following the provision of the results to the participant.
5. Ngatia also found that when a social contact was randomly assigned to receive a low incentive, this decreased the likelihood of a person getting tested. She argues that this is tied to the
stigma suffered by the social contact, who, by requesting a test while only receiving a small
incentive, is implicitly acknowledging being at risk of infection. With each additional dollar
that the social contact receives, this negative effect is reduced by 2.8 percent.
6. Ngatia justifies this decision by explaining that “since the advent and wide rollout of rapid
HIV-testing where test results are ready forty-five minutes after testing, the decision to get
tested at all might be more relevant in today’s context” (Ngatia 2016, 9).
7. Sex Worker Interview August 24, 2009 csw5.
8. Sex Worker Interview August 16, 2009 csw5. This quote and the previous one do not come
from participants in the field experiment described in this article; they come instead from sex
workers interviewed at a different time and in a different place in China.
9. If their HIV-positive status were kept confidential, sex workers could choose to not disclose it
and continue to engage in prostitution. However, it is a crime to knowingly infect someone
with HIV in China. In addition, as discussed in the footnote below, sex workers are likely to
assume that their HIV status would not be kept confidential.
10. Sex worker interview August 16, 2009 csw1, Beijing.
11. Sex worker interview August 24, 2009 csw2, Beijing.
12. Sex worker interview August 24, 2009 csw5, Beijing.
13. Sex worker interview August 25, 2009 csw1, Beijing. These quotes do not come from participants in the field experiment described in this article; they come instead from sex workers
interviewed at a different time and in a different place.
14. These data come from the China Statistical Yearbook, Offense Cases against Public Order
Handled by Public Security Organs, under the category of “Prostitution or Soliciting Prostitutes.”
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/annualdata/
(accessed
October
10, 2018).
15. This was convenience sampling. Staff spread news that they were recruiting sex workers to
participate in a study through word of mouth. They shared the information with sex workers
who stopped by the community center and asked them to spread the word to their acquaintances. They also went to sex work venues and public spaces in the district to recruit
participants.
16. The hospital testing facilities kept special hours for this study and, on those days and times,
would not have accepted patients who did not have a card from us. The card also entitled each
participant to a free breast and pelvic exam. These were not part of the experiment. Rather,
they were provided as a general service to each sex worker. The breast and pelvic exams are
widely available for free in unregistered clinics where sex workers usually go for birth control
or abortions as a way to attract them as patients. These unregulated, illegal clinics are unable
to obtain the equipment and supplies necessary to provide HIV tests for their patients. Focus
group discussions in preparation for the experiment and open-ended interviews with participants afterward both suggest that these two exams would not have been a significant factor in
a sex worker’s decision to go to the hospital for an HIV test. Nevertheless, they should be
noted for future replications of this design. Study participants could choose to get any combination of the three tests, but would only receive an incentive if they got the HIV test. Only one
experiment participant who went to the hospital declined the HIV test. Since the outcome variable is whether or not the respondent received an HIV/AIDS test, this person is included as
not having gotten the test. The others requested all three services.
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17. It takes about twenty minutes to walk from the red light district to the hospital. It takes five
minutes and costs ¥1 (15 cents) to take the bus. The taxi ride takes about three minutes and
costs ¥10 ($1.50).
18. Cheating at any stage of this process is unlikely. Cards could not be easily replicated—each
had three distinct markings that would have required forging my handwriting (my signature
in the bottom left-hand corner), that of one of my research assistants (the “Merry Christmas”
inscription on the top of the card), and obtaining a sticker not readily available in China (not
shown, on the other side of the card). Similarly, it is highly unlikely that a sex worker in the
clinic would have been able to obtain the hospital form without getting the test. It is possible
that participants could have given their card to someone else to receive the tests and the incentive. That said, the research assistants who administered the baseline survey and treatments
were also present at the hospital, and they generally reported seeing the same individuals.
19. In fall 2015, the one-child policy was changed to a two-child policy for all married couples.
20. For the same reasons that they are less likely to get an HIV test, discussed above, lower-tier
sex workers are also more difficult to access. This explains the greater proportion of middletier sex workers in the sample.
21. Just by random chance, we would expect one of these to turn up significant at p < 0.05.
22. In terms of numbers of participants, 55 of the 107 respondents assigned to the small incentive
got tested.
23. In terms of numbers of participants, 99 of the 106 respondents assigned to the large incentive
got tested.
24. The analyses reported thus far compare outcomes across the two randomly assigned conditions without controlling for any observational covariates. Appendix II presents analyses with
covariates included and demonstrates that these results are robust to specification.
25. Regressing the treatment on whether or not participants request an HIV test and including an
interaction with tier of prostitution yields a p-value of .037.
26. Due to rounding, the twenty-seven percentage point increase adds up to 90 rather than 91 percent, and the forty-five percentage point increase adds up to 95 rather than 94 percent.
27. It is reasonable to think that the lack of statistical significance could be tied to the small sample size, as these confidence intervals would shrink if the study were carried out with a larger
sample.
28. Precisely because distrust of state institutions is prevalent within communities of marginalized
individuals, public health organizations recommend that trained peer educators, rather than state
actors, conduct outreach among individuals such as sex workers and intravenous drug users
(Kaufman 2011; Dennis 2003). It is also important not to overstate the possible role of the community organization in this study. It was a small organization, located in an inconspicuous room
in a building in the district, with only two full-time staff members. It actively sought to maintain
a low profile in order to avoid any unnecessary interactions with the local authorities. In contrast,
it is situated in a red light district that is home to tens of thousands of sex workers. This is a
migrant population that is extremely mobile. While some women maintain residence in the area
for years, more often women will work there for a few months before moving to another district,
city, or region. The size and mobility of this population means that the community organization
is constantly interacting with new sex workers who are unaware of their existence and work. In
addition, the concept of civil society is not well understood in China, especially among individuals who are less educated and worldly. This background underscores how some study participants may have heard of the community organization prior to study recruitment, while others
may not have. Some might have been quickly drawn in by the knowledge that they were interacting with members of a civil society organization, while the distinction between the state and civil
society may not have been as clear to others.
29. One way to effectively gauge the role of the community organization would be for a future
study to randomize whether enumerators identified themselves with the state or with a civil
society organization.
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Santé 8: 234–38.
Dennis, Cindy-Lee. 2003. “Peer Support within a Health Care Context: A Concept Analysis,”
International Journal of Nursing Studies 40: 321–32.
Fan, Elsa L. 2017. “Counting Results: Performance-Based Financing and HIV Testing among
MSM in China,” Critical Public Health 27: 217–27.
Ford, Kathleen, Dewa Wirawan, Gusti Sumantera, Anak Sawitri, and Mandy Stahre. 2004. “Voluntary HIV Testing, Disclosure, and Stigma Among Injection Drug Users in Bali, Indonesia,”
AIDS Education and Prevention 16: 487–98.
Fu, Hualing, and D. W. Choy. 2009. “Administrative Detention of Prostitutes: The Legal
Aspects.” In Gender Policy and HIV in China, edited by Joseph Tucker, Dudley L. Poston, Jr.,
Qiang Ren, Baochang Gu, Xiaoying Zheng, Stephanie Wang, and Chris Russell, 189–99.
Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer.
Fu, Hualing, and D. W. Choy. 2004. “Policing for Profit: Fiscal Crisis and Institutionalized Corruption of Chinese Police.” In Policing, Security and Corruption, 537–52. Huntsville, TX: Office
of International Criminal Justice, Sam Houston State University, Criminal Justice Center.
Ginwalla, S. K., A. D. Grant, J. H. Day, T. W. Dlova, S. Macintyre, R. Baggaley, and
G. J. Churchyard. 2002. “Use of UNAIDS Tools to Evaluate HIV Voluntary Counselling and
Testing Services for Mineworkers in South Africa,” AIDS Care 14: 707–26.
Global Fund. 2006. “The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria: Sixth Call for
Proposals Guidelines.”
Goette, Lorenz F., and Alois Stutzer. 2008. Blood Donations and Incentives: Evidence from a Field
Experiment. IZA Working Paper No. 3580. Bonn, Germany: IZA Institute of Labor Economics. http://ssrn.com/paper=1158977 (accessed September 19, 2018).
Goffman, Alice. 2009. “On the Run: Wanted Men in a Philadelphia Ghetto,” American Sociological Review 74: 339–57.

© 2018 The Author
Law & Policy © 2018 The University of Denver/Colorado Seminary

Boittin

INCENTIVES AND HIV/AIDS TESTING

419

Grusky, Oscar, Kathleen Johnston Roberts, and Aimee-Noelle Swanson. 2007. “Failure to Return
for HIV Test Results: A Pilot Study of Three Community Testing Sites,” Journal of the International Association of Physicians in AIDS Care 6: 47–55.
Hong, Yan, Chen Zhang, Xiaoming Li, Xiaoyi Fang, Xiuyun Lin, Yuejiao Zhou, and Wei Liu.
2012. “HIV Testing Behaviors Among Female Sex Workers in Southwest China,” AIDS and
Behavior 16: 44–52.
Horizon Market Research. 2002. “2001 Behavioural Surveillance Survey in Yunnan and Sichuan:
Sex Worker Report.”
Howell, Jennifer L., and James A. Shepperd. 2013. “Reducing Health-Information Avoidance
through Contemplation,” Psychological Science 24: 1696–1703.
Huang, Yingying. 2010. “Debate: Prostitution,” China Daily May 5.
Human Rights Watch. 2013. Swept Away: Abuses against Sex Workers in China. https://www.hrw.
org/report/2013/05/14/swept-away/abuses-against-sex-workers-china
(accessed
September
19, 2018).
Hutchinson, Angela B., Giselle Corbie-Smith, Stephen B. Thomas, Sveta Mohanan, and Carlos
del Rio. 2004. “Understanding the Patient’s Perspective on Rapid and Routine HIV Testing in
an Inner-City Urgent Care Center,” AIDS Education and Prevention 16: 101–14.
Jacobs, Andrew. 2009. “H.I.V. Tests Turn Blood into Cash in China,” New York Times December
3. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/health/policy/03china.html?_r=1&partner=rssnyt&emc=
rss (accessed September 19, 2018).
Kalichman, S. C., and L. C. Simbayi. 2003. “HIV Testing Attitudes, AIDS Stigma, and Voluntary
HIV Counselling and Testing in a Black Township in Cape Town, South Africa,” Sexually
Transmitted Infections 79: 442–47.
Kaufman, Joan. 2011. “HIV, Sex Work, and Civil Society in China,” Journal of Infectious Diseases 204 (Suppl. 5): S1218–22.
Kaufman, Joan, Arthur Kleinman, and Tony Saich. 2006. “Introduction: Social Policy and HIV/AIDS in China.” In AIDS and Social Policy in China, edited by Joan Kauffman,
Arthur Kleinman, and Tony Saich, 3–14. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center.
Kremer, Michael, and Edward Miguel. 2007. “The Illusion of Sustainability,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 122: 1007–65.
Lacetera, Nicola, Mario Macis, and Robert Slonim. 2012. “Will There Be Blood? Incentives and
Displacement Effects in Pro-Social Behavior,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4:
186–223.
Levine, Kay, and Virginia Mellema. 2001. “Review: Strategizing the Street: How Law Matters in
the Lives of Women in the Street-Level Drug Economy,” Law & Social Inquiry 26: 169–207.
Li, Weiguo. 2013. “China Sexologist Li Yinhe Advocates Decriminalizing Adult Prostitution,”
ABC Radio Australia May 15.
Loevinsohn, Benjamin P., and Michael E. Loevinsohn. 1987. “Well Child Clinics and Mass Vaccination Campaigns: An Evaluation of Strategies for Improving the Coverage of Primary Health
Care in a Developing Country,” American Journal of Public Health 77: 1407–11.
Magnani, Elisabetta, and Rong Zhu. 2012. “Gender Wage Differentials among Rural–Urban
Migrants in China,” Regional Science and Urban Economics 42: 779–93.
Martins, Nelson, Peter Morris, and Paul M. Kelly. 2009. “Food Incentives to Improve Completion of Tuberculosis Treatment: Randomised Controlled Trial in Dili, Timor-Leste,” BMJ 339.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2767482/ (accessed September 19, 2018).
Miller, Casey James. 2016. “Dying for Money: The Effects of Global Health Initiatives on NGOs Working with Gay Men and HIV/AIDS in Northwest China,” Medical Anthropology Quarterly 30: 414–30.
Ministry of Education of the PRC. n.d. Promotion Rate of Graduates. http://www.moe.edu.cn/
publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/s6200/201201/129607.html (accessed September 19, 2018).
Ministry of Health of China. 2010. 2009 Estimates for the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in China. http://www.
unaids.org.cn/download/2009%20China%20Estimation%20Report-En.pdf (accessed September
19, 2018).
Ministry of Health of the PRC. 2013. 2012 China AIDS Response Progress Report. http://www.
unaids.org.cn/en/index/Document_view.asp?id=770 (accessed September 19, 2018).
- - -. 2015. 2015 China AIDS Response Progress Report. http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/
country/documents/CHN_narrative_report_2015.pdf (accessed September 19, 2018).
Morris, Saul S., Rafael Flores, Pedro Olinto, and Juan Manuel Medina. 2004. “Monetary Incentives in Primary Health Care and Effects on Use and Coverage of Preventive Health Care Interventions in Rural Honduras: Cluster Randomised Trial,” The Lancet 364 (9450): 2030–37.

© 2018 The Author
Law & Policy © 2018 The University of Denver/Colorado Seminary

420

LAW & POLICY October 2018

Mugusi, Ferdinand M., Robert M. Josiah, Adeline Moshi, Stella Chale, Muhammad Bakari,
Eric A. Aris, Paul Magao, Ndetiyo Pallangyo, Eric G. Sandstorm, Gunnel Biberfeld,
Fred S. Mhalu, Kisali Pallangyo. 2002. “Dropouts in a Long-Term Follow-up Study Involving
Voluntary Counseling and HIV Testing: Experience from a Cohort of Police Officers in Dar Es
Salaam, Tanzania,” Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 30: 119–23.
Ngatia, Muthoni. 2016. “Social Interactions, Stigma, and HIV Testing.” https://77f0703f-a62cb3a1a-s-sites.googlegroups.com/site/ngatia/papers/ngatiaJMPSocialInteractionsandIndividual
ReproductiveDecisions.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7cqZ42g_yeE43Fb9USnI_vlK_lzCHfG0rFfv78Rb7LPZSaqbNqzDAfhgKUo_35lAklNPuV7MwVaoQlUJSNBMxw77ePXWOQS2FJngPm835y2B3
vLQCN2Rg92LaoyEboj3T1dGAM9o4It73-i5DFwO_41TBOiiBhSS1OEVe0gwK4waZSEKp76fs
SCo_bKtSRoDEJsNE9mgwBKmEiGBb4oc4CZ6tSNyO0ymJIpaGsT5PriJ6NYI3ZvrebpifkoIc8v
SZuzsX-ONOPM84g148f_x0K7DIrk6A%3D%3D&attredirects=1 (accessed October 10, 2018).
Pan, Suiming. 2008. “‘Legalize Prostitution’ and ‘Socially Manage Prostitution,’” Chinese Sexuality Research 1 (4). http://www.sex-study.org/news.php?isweb=2&sort=114&id=833 (accessed
September 3, 2013).
Petry, Nancy M., Carla J. Rash, Shannon Byrne, Shehryar Ashraf, and William B. White. 2012.
“Financial Reinforcers for Improving Medication Adherence: Findings from a Meta-Analysis,”
American Journal of Medicine 125: 888–96.
Ren, Minghui, Fabio Scano, Catherine Sozi, and Bernhard Schwartländer. 2015. “The Global
Fund in China: Success Beyond the Numbers,” Lancet Global Health 3: e75–77. https://doi.
org/10.1016/S2214-109X(14)70366-3 (accessed September 19, 2018).
Rose, Dina R., and Todd R. Clear. 1998. “Incarceration, Social Capital, and Crime: Implications
for Social Disorganization Theory,” Criminology 36: 441–80.
Rou, Keming, Sheena G. Sullivan, Peng Liu, and Zunyou Wu. 2010. “Scaling Up Prevention Programmes to Reduce the Sexual Transmission of HIV in China,” International Journal of Epidemiology 39 (Suppl. 2): ii38–46.
Saich, Tony. 2006. “Social Policy Development in the Era of Economic Reform.” In AIDS and
Social Policy in China, edited by Joan Kaufman, Arthur Kleinman, and Tony Saich, 15–46.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center.
Sullivan, Patrick S., Amy Lansky, Amy Drake, and HITS-2000 Investigators. 2004. “Failure to
Return for HIV Test Results among Persons at High Risk for HIV Infection: Results from a
Multistate Interview Project,” Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 35: 511–18.
Thornton, Rebecca L. 2008. “The Demand for, and Impact of, Learning HIV Status,” American
Economic Review 98: 1829–63.
UNAIDS. 2009. UNAIDS Guidance Note on HIV and Sex Work. http://www.unaids.org/sites/
default/files/sub_landing/files/JC2306_UNAIDS-guidance-note-HIV-sex-work_en.pdf (accessed
September 19, 2018).
Uretsky, Elanah. 2008. “‘Mobile Men with Money’: The Socio-cultural and Politico-economic
Context of ‘High-Risk’ Behaviour Among Wealthy Businessmen and Government Officials in
Urban China,” Culture, Health & Sexuality 10: 801–14.
Volpp, Kevin, Andrea B. Troxel, Mark V. Pauly, Henry A. Glick, Andrea Puig, David A. Asch,
Robert Galvin, Jingsan Zhu, Fei Wan, Jill DeGuzman, Elizabeth Corbett, Janet Weiner, and
Janet Audrain-McGovern. 2009. “A Randomized Controlled Trial of Financial Incentives for
Smoking Cessation,” New England Journal of Medicine 360: 699–709.
Volpp, Kevin, Andrea Gurmankin Levy, David A. Asch, Jesse A. Berlin, John J. Murphy,
Angela Gomez, Harold Sox, Jingsan Zhu, and Caryn Lerman. 2006. “A Randomized Controlled Trial of Financial Incentives for Smoking Cessation,” Cancer Epidemiology Biomarkers &
Prevention 15: 12–18.
de Walque, Damien, William H. Dow, Rose Nathan, Ramadhani Abdul, Faraji Abilahi,
Erick Gong, Zachary Isdahl, Julian Jamison, Boniphace Jullu, Suneeta Krishnan,
Albert Majura, Edward Miguel, Jeanne Moncada, Sally Mtenga, Mathew
Alexander Mwanyangala, Laura Packel, Julius Schachter, Kizito Shirima, and
Carol A. Medlin. 2012. “Incentivising Safe Sex: A Randomised Trial of Conditional Cash
Transfers for HIV and Sexually Transmitted Infection Prevention in Rural Tanzania,” BMJ
Open 2 (1). http://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/2/1/e000747 (accessed September 19, 2018).
Wan, Yanhai, Hu Ran, Guo Ran, and Linda Arnade. 2010. “Discrimination against People with
HIV/AIDS in China,” Equal Rights Review 4 (February): 15–25.

© 2018 The Author
Law & Policy © 2018 The University of Denver/Colorado Seminary

Boittin

INCENTIVES AND HIV/AIDS TESTING

421

Wang Dayang. 2012. “Representative Chi Susheng: Proposing a Motion to Legalize Prostitution
For Nine Years,” March 11. http://www.ycwb.com/news_special/2012-03/11/content_3741498.
htm (accessed September 19, 2018).
Watts, Jonathan. 2006. “Outrage at Chinese Prostitutes’ Shame Parade,” The Guardian December
6. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/dec/06/china.jonathanwatts (accessed September
19, 2018).
Weaver, Vesla M., and Amy E. Lerman. 2010. “Political Consequences of the Carceral State,”
American Political Science Review 104: 817–33.
Wolff, Brent, Barbara Nyanzi, George Katongole, Deo Ssesanga, Anthony Ruberantwari, and
Jimmy Whitworth. 2005. “Evaluation of a Home-Based Voluntary Counselling and Testing
Intervention in Rural Uganda,” Health Policy and Planning 20: 109–16.
Wolffers, Ivan, and Nel van Beelen. 2003. “Public Health and the Human Rights of Sex
Workers,” The Lancet 361 (9373): 1981.
World Health Organization, UNFPA, and UNAIDS. 2012. Prevention and Treatment of HIV and
Other Sexually Transmitted Infections for Sex Workers in Low and Middle-Income Countries.
http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/presscentre/featurestories/2012/
december/20121212sexworkguidance/ (accessed September 19, 2018).
Wu, Zunyou, Yu Wang, Roger Detels, and Mary Jane Rotheram-Borus. 2010. “China AIDS Policy Implementation: Reversing the HIV/AIDS Epidemic by 2015,” International Journal of Epidemiology 39 (Suppl. 2): ii1–3.
Yi, Huso, Joanne E. Mantell, Rongrong Wu, Zhao Lu, Jing Zeng, and Yanhai Wan. 2010. “A
Profile of HIV Risk Factors in the Context of Sex Work Environments among Migrant Female
Sex Workers in Beijing, China,” Psychology, Health & Medicine 15: 172–87.
Zheng, Tiantian. 2009. Red Lights: The Lives of Sex Workers in Postsocialist China. Minneapolis:
Univ. of Minnesota Press.
Zhou, Ruijin. 2006. “Delegates at the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Congress Should Discuss the Underground Sex Industry,” Dongfang Wang January
19. http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/35560/4042747.html (accessed September 19, 2018).
Zi Teng. 2008. “Commentary,” Sexually Transmitted Infections 84: 36.

© 2018 The Author
Law & Policy © 2018 The University of Denver/Colorado Seminary

422

LAW & POLICY October 2018
APPENDIX I: COMPARISON OF SEX WORKER SURVEY DEMOGRAPHICS

Given the difficulty of access to sex workers in China, there are a very limited number
of carefully conducted, rigorous surveys of this population. None of these surveys
have representative samples, either nationally or locally, which complicates attempts
to discuss with confidence how my sample compares to the overall population. In
Table 4, I compare some of the basic characteristics of study participants with those
of two other studies of Chinese sex workers. The first is a 2001 survey that Horizon
Market Research conducted in collaboration with Futures Group Europe, which surveyed a total of 811 female sex workers in the provinces of Sichuan and Yunnan. The
second, carried out by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) from 2006 to
2008, surveyed a total of 2,040 sex workers in the provinces of Jilin, Gansu, Guizhou,
Hainan, and Xinjiang. These are the two largest surveys of Chinese sex workers of
reliable quality.

Table 4. Comparisons of Demographics across Sex Worker Surveys
Variable
Respondent Characteristics
Age (mean)
Married (%)
Completed Mandatory 9 Years of
Schooling (Graduated from
Middle School) (%)
Sex Work Experience
Number of Years Selling Sex
(mean)
Middle-Tier Brothel Work (%)
Lower-Tier Brothel Work (%)
Price of Most Recent Transaction
(Mean)
Health Knowledge and Practices
Has Heard of STDs (%)
Has Heard of AIDS (%)
Previously Had an AIDS Test (%)

2009 Survey
(Beijing)

2001 Survey (Sichuan
and Yunnan)

2006–2008 Survey (Jilin, Gansu,
Guizhou, Hainan, Xinjiang)

32 years
63
78

22 years
29
82

27 years
36
57

3

2.5

N/A

82
18
¥548

N/A
N/A
¥175

49
51
N/A

92
98
25

94
97
11

N/A
N/A
N/A
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APPENDIX II: RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT UNDER DIFFERENT ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES
MODEL SPECIFICATIONS

DV: HIV/AIDS Test
(1)
0.34***
(0.06)
-0.34***
(0.09)
0.31*

Constant

0.60***
(0.04)

0.61***
(0.06)

(3)
0.35***
(0.07)
-0.34**
(0.12)
0.18
(0.22)
0.04
(0.07)
-0.06
(0.07)
-0.03
(0.07)
-0.11
(0.08)
0.00
(0.00)
0.01
(0.02)
-0.05
(0.07)
0.00
(0.00)
0.01
(0.02)
-18.88
(35.20)

R2
SER
N

0.28
0.38
213

0.27
0.39
209

0.27
0.39
174

Large Incentive
Low-Tier Venue
Large Incentive X Low-Tier Venue

(2)
0.32***
(0.06)
-0.34***
(0.09)
0.31*
0.03
(0.06)
-0.02
(0.06)

Previous AIDS Test
Previous Health Checkup
From Rural Area
Completed Mandatory 9 Years of Schooling
Months Selling Sex
Age
Married
Price Last Client
Age Started Selling Sex

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*= p < .05.
**= p < .01.
***= p < .001.

APPENDIX III: RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT USING NONPARAMETRIC TEST

Did Not Get HIV/AIDS Test
Got HIV/AIDS Test
Total

Small Incentive

Large Incentive

52 (48.60%)
55 (51.40%)
107 (100%)

7 (6.60%)
99 (93.40%)
106 (100%)

Pearson chi2(1) = 46.8898. Pr = 0.000.
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Total
59 (27.70%)
154 (72.30%)
213 (100%)

